On the first day of 1994 the native population of Chiapas, Mexico rebelled against the country’s federal government. The Zapatistas, as they are known, were led by a man known only as Subcomandante Marcos and desired recognition and political autonomy in order to focus greater attention on the region’s dire economic situation. The signing and implementation of the NAFTA agreement served as the impetus for the insurgency, however similar violent outbreaks did not occur in the United States or Canada – why is this? Undoubtedly the primary cause lies in the economic differences between the developed countries of the NAFTA region, the US and Canada, and the developing country, Mexico. Also, historic political and ethnic differences played a large role in the differing reactions across the region.

After the signing of the NAFTA agreement the Zapatistas unleashed their violent fury in a quest to achieve work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace, according to Noam Chomsky’s Profit Over People. The NAFTA agreement, while not the only reason for the Zapatistas’ uprising, reinforced decades of Mexican governmental policy that ignored the concerns of Mexico’s native population. The majority of Mexico’s indigenous people utilize agriculture as a living via the family farm economic configuration. While family farms in the US and Canada exist and are even subsidized, they are not considered a necessary portion of every day life for a large number of people. Simply, the death of family farms in the US and Canada would not create wide-ranging poverty – resources are available for re-training and re-assimilation into the developed economic machines. Mexico, a developing country with a large, agricultural native population cannot stave off mass poverty when agriculture is directly assaulted by unfair trade. Due to agricultural protectionism on behalf of the United States, Mexican farmers are incapable of adequately competing and, thus, lose their livelihood. The natives’ family farms are no longer as profitable as they once were, extending and worsening poverty conditions in Chiapas and other regions where agriculture serves as the main industry for thousands of people. Also, the expansion of agribusiness-backed crash-crop farms has overtaken native family farms in order to compete with American food dumping. However, pay remains low in these mass production farms and do little to aid the poverty-stricken.

NAFTA, however, is not the only reason for the Zapatistas’ continuing discontent or why similar uprisings did not occur in the US and Canada. The Zapatistas’ concerns started long before the signing of the agreement, decades ago with the rise of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) impenetrable grip on power led to wide-ranging corruption. Mexico’s elite profited greatly from the PRI’s control, whereas the native population were subjugated and their concerns completely ignored. Current president Vincente Fox, who broke the PRI’s decades-old hold on power by way of his National Action Party (PAN), was supposed to bring about change and autonomy for Mexico’s natives in Chiapas. Instead, Fox proved completely ineffectual and, following the 2003 mid-term elections, serves as little more than a lame duck with basically no chance of meeting the Zapatistas’ many demands. The US and Canada both had fairly healthy democracies throughout the 20th century, unlike Mexico, which led to better representation at the federal levels. The Zapatistas as of 2003 have resulted to ignoring the federal Mexican government as much as possible since adequate representation of their interests appears to be an impossible goal, especially during a time of political uncertainty under an unpopular Vincente Fox.

While the Zapatistas have not gained all they have demanded, their concerns have been voiced and the world has noticed. Economic differences and unfair trade practices have negatively affected the already poverty-stricken in Mexico and the legacy of corrupt one-party rule continues to make a wide-reaching agreement between the indigenous rebels and the Mexican government an untenable outcome. The US and Canada, both highly developed democracies with diverse, yet inclusive populations, have not seen the same problems concerning NAFTA. Until Mexico can achieve comparable healthy institutions and competitive economic structures, the Zapatistas’ situation will not improve.

Perhaps the biggest argument in foreign policy decision-making circles today is whether or not the United States should pursue interventionist means when dealing with problem states. It is an extremely important discussion to have, especially as the war in Iraq continues well into its third year. Should the US have intervened in Iraq to begin with, and if so what made direct involvement with Iraq through military means an obvious choice over other so-called rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea? Defining a rule set for intervening in rogue states is essential before pro-interventionist policy can be cemented within US institutional memory, and that is assuming such a policy should be adopted for the long term. Current events in Iraq combined with history – Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iran all come to mind — suggest that US interventionism does not necessarily culminate with beneficial results for the country’s long term foreign policy objectives.

Understanding the different types of intervention is essential before any discussion can be had. There is preventive action as well as preemptive action. Preventive war is an offensive military action meant to stave off potential future threats, even if those threat do not currently exist within a problem state. Preemption is where knowledge of a future attack exists, and any action is technically defensive. The Iraq war was a preventive action on behalf of the Bush administration, and the question remains whether or not it has aided or harmed the United States’ security. Events in Iraq are currently unfolding, so piecing together an adequate view of the United States’ security based on Iraqi events is difficult and, at best, guesswork. However, how the Iraqi war and preventive intervention has affected the United States’ geopolitical standing in the region and world is currently being felt and will continue to affect US strategic moves for decades to come. It may be more helpful currently to examine how interventionism, or preventive action, has weakened the US by taking its attention away from other problem areas the world over.

The Bush administration targeted Iraq supposedly because it was developing weapons of mass destruction that were to be used against US targets. While that meme has been proven false and the intelligence faulty, the administration continues to suggest that the preventive action to topple Saddam Hussein has made the US safer. The argument seems laughable, however, when one examines the current danger posed by Iran and, especially North Korea. While the United States’ is bogged down in Iraq with scant little forces remaining to engage other potential threats throughout the world, North Korea retains nuclear weapons and Iran is potentially developing their own. If prevention is adopted as the new foreign policy framework, it would be best suited to deal with the most obvious threats to US security. Selecting potential targets for intervention is the most difficult aspect of the doctrine, and requires accurate intelligence collection and analysis, which cannot always be relied upon. Also, no matter what action is taken in another country the remaining threats to the US – be they states or malevolent non-state actors – will capitalize on the world’s most powerful military being occupied to further develop plans or undertake violent operations. By selecting Iraq, arguably the incorrect target for intervention, the United States’ interests may have been harmed, strengthening rival Iran’s influence in the region and world.

Iran is reaping huge rewards from the US military involvement in Iraq, realizing that it can push the international community on its nuclear program since no true threat of reactive force exists outside of Israel. With Israel being held on a short leash by the United States for fear of a potential crisis in Iraq propagated by Iran-backed Shi’ite militias, Iran is left with free reign to negotiate its own terms on nuclear development. Also, Iran’s control over massive oil reserves has granted it even more leverage, which could be increased further if it attempts to coordinate its petro-policy with Shi’ite-dominated Iraq and a Russia disinterested in pursuing wide-ranging international sanctions. Energy-hungry China also does not wish to pursue sanctions on Iran, since it directly benefits from Iranian oil. Having little recourse, the United States has had to weaken its line of negotiation since involvement in Iraq has made wide-reaching military operations impossible and sabre-rattling completely ineffective. With Iraq serving as a case study, it would appear the preventive intervention can cause more trouble than good since since the potential policy blowback was not taken into consideration.

Policy blowback, however, should have been forseen had Bush administration policymakers simply took the lessons of history to heart. Intervention has rarely worked in the experience of the United States, as in Korea and Vietnam. The Korean War signaled the true start of the Cold War, with Soviet-supported North Korea’s invasion of US-backed South Korea. President Truman decided to pursue full intervention in June of 1950. Despite the United States’ best efforts, the war reached a stalemate in 1953 where it technically remains until this day. Due to the failure of intervention, North Korea remains a threat to the United States and East Asia. Failure in Vietnam, however, is the most beneficial historical case study that the Bush administration should have taken lessons from. Similar to Korea, Communist forces from North Vietnam invaded US-backed South Vietnam and led to U.S. intervention. Despite massive military involvement and expenditure, the US was forced to withdraw in 1973 and left the Vietnamese to determine their own future.
Intervention, though, does not necessarily have to be on a full scale military level. Clandestine support for groups supporting US interests at one point in time may result in disastrous blowback, as in Afghanistan with the mujahideen fighters and in Iran with the coup of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. By supporting the Islamist fighters in Afghanistan against Soviet military advancement in the 1980s, the United States trained and armed the future al Qaeda. By toppling the elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1953, the US set events in motion that would eventually lead to the rise of the Islamist movement and Ayatollah Khomeini.

None of what has been mentioned is to suggest that intervention as a tool of foreign policy should be completely discarded. Obviously, intervention is sometimes required – prevention, however, may not be. Vietnam, Korea, the Afghan-Soviet War, and the rise of Mossadegh were all events that did not directly harm the United States, and all were deserving of greater scrutiny at the time. Indeed it is easy to point out the mistakes of the past, but it should also be simple to see those mistakes for what they are now and apply them to current situations. The Bush administration failed in doing that with Iraq, and has harmed the case for preventive war and intervention almost irrevocably. It is unfortunate since when intervention is required one day the American public may not be so willing to trust their government – the Vietnam Syndrome replayed as the Iraq Syndrome, preemption mistaken for misguided prevention.

Latin America has fought its way from colonial domination to its current, primarily democratic configuration in the modern era. The legacy of colonial rule has remained in the Latin American states, however, and has greatly affected the region’s political and economic development. Widespread wealth disparities still remain, and are a result of colonial era economic development that created rigid class structures and ugly political backlash. For those states who have seen the most development, their economic direction also remains linked to the developed world. Dependency theory – or the theory that the developing countries are economically beholden to the developed countries of the world — remains popular and has led modern Latin American states toward finding their own path in the era of globalization. Latin America is still a developing region, and struggles to balance developmental policy alongside out right independence.

The colonial conquerers that entered Latin America did so looking for profit to increase the wealth of their home countries as well as their own personal prestige. The Spanish conquistadors were the first Europeans to enter the Latin American region set on complete conquest. They brought devastation and then domination to the Aztecs in current day Mexico and then the Incas in today’s Peru. The indigenous people who were not killed by Spanish arms fire or disease were forced to harvest the land for the Spanish Crown, which created the colonial economic framework seen throughout the rest of Latin America as Spain, and then other European powers, expanded their control across the region. The primary function of the colonies held by Spain, France, England, Denmark, and Portugal, to an extent, was the enrichment of the crown at the expense of the local peasantry. It also allowed European citizens an alternative approach for success via meritocracy. Since prestige was no longer easy to grasp in the Old World, the New World offered many opportunities for advancement. After decades of domination, a mixed Latin American culture arose. European men outnumbered women in the New World by at least a 7-to-1 ratio, which created a new mixed ethnic group, Mestizos, that now make up the vast majority of Latin America.

In the decades following colonial domination, Creole leaders of European descent became the dominant class, holding land and running haciendas with indigenous people, Africans, and Mestizos serving as the primary laborers. However, those among the laboring class wished to gain status and advance past harvesting crops for colonial overlords. As the colonial powers declined, local political structures began to break down and new opportunities via colonial militia arose. The armed forces allowed simple laborers to advance in society through the achievement of military rank, which also proved attractive to many creole leaders. By 1800, there were only 6,000 members of the Spanish army in the New World in comparison to 22,000 Latin America-born servicemen. Such an imbalance obviously did not suit the colonial powers, and was a factor in the oncoming independence movements.

Following independence, the class structures set in place during the colonial era were still apparent. Military leaders continued to gain power and took full control over several Latin American governments, instituting bureaucratic authoritarianism. The military regimes took technical lines on economic development, instituting a number of policies the region over that proved effective for short periods, but eventually fell under the weight of global economics. Argentina’s Jose Peron, who gained status by way of the Argentine military, utilized the labor classes’ desire for change to institute import substitution policies to jumpstart development. Chile’s working class also clamored for change after years of under-development and elected a socialist president in 1970, who was then deposed by military technocrats in 1973 led by General Augusto Pinochet. Brazil also came under the rule of military leaders in 1964, who remained in control until 1985. Peru, Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, and Venezuela have all seen military authoritarianism since their independence, as well.

Today, military rule in Latin America is no more, unless Cuba is taken into account. The technocrats failed in their long-term plans, with many undone by the widespread desire for liberty and democracy. The rise of democracies the region over meant a new trend toward United States-promoted neoliberal free trade policies. The fear of outside domination is still palpable across Latin America, however, and exists as a side effect of past colonial rule and economic downturns connected to global economic changes. The technocrats produced by Latin American militarizes predominantly came to power in order to solve economic slowdowns as perpetrated by fluxuating global market prices. The democracies of today’s Latin America must deal with similar economic issues, although no major economic crashes, such as the Great Depression, have occurred in the modern era to force new, widespread political structural changes. The main economic conflict in today’s Latin America is whether or not to fully accept American free trade policies, which would be instituted through joining the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), or take on more region-specific policies to retain independence and a buffer from global economic problems. CARICOM and MERCOSUR have arisen as regional alternatives to the hemispheric FTAA.

The colonial legacy has deeply affected the political and economic conditions in Latin America, and remain heavy on the minds of Latin American leaders. The colonial era led to the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism throughout the region, and set a number of governments, including those of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, on the path toward political suppression and economic disaster. Fear over renewed domination through a sort of economic neo-imperialism has led many South American leaders to fear further economic integration with the developed world. Leaders such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s Evo Moralez have arisen to represent the paranoia of Latin America, and the region’s growing anti-American populism.