Muqtada al-Sadr’s power grab strategy in the wake of massive sectarian clashes within Sadr City is clear. The first part concerns his allies in the cabinet, who have threatened to quit the government if Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki meets with President Bush in Jordan next week:
Describing Bush as “the killer of Iraqi people,” politicians aligned with al-Sadr repeated their demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and said Iraqi officials should sever all ties with the United States. Al-Sadr’s allies are the backbone of al-Maliki’s Cabinet, and even a temporary suspension of their participation would cripple, if not topple, Iraq’s fragile U.S.-backed government.
“They are telling the ordinary people that if the American forces withdraw from Iraq, this will provoke more violence. We say, since the minute they stepped on this ground, chaos and instability have spread throughout the country,” said Saleh Hassan al-Agili, one of 30 legislators from al-Sadr’s parliamentary bloc. “We reiterate that the departure of the occupying forces will restore stability, security and the brotherhood of the Iraqi people.”
Residents in some Sunni areas of Baghdad said they saw U.S. patrols in their areas Friday, but a U.S. military spokesman would confirm only troop movements to “enhance existing security arrangements.” An American attack helicopter destroyed rocket launchers in Sadr City after Shiite militants there fired six times into a Sunni neighborhood, according to a U.S. military statement. No casualties were reported.
If the American forces were to leave, al-Sadr’s militia forces would find themselves free of constraints.
The second part of Sadr’s plan: feign an interest in peace with the Sunnis, utilizing Hareth al-Dhari, the leader of the Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars, as a focal point:
Al-Sadr issued a challenge to his onetime ally and current nemesis, leading Sunni cleric Hareth al-Dhari, during prayers Friday in the southern Shiite city of Kufa.
“I demand Sheik Hareth al-Dhari issue a fatwa (a religious decree) prohibiting the killing of Shiites, so as to spare Muslim blood,”al-Sadr told about 5,000 followers.
He also called on his Sunni counterpart to ban his supporters from joining al-Qaida or other terrorist groups, and to participate in rebuilding a Shiite shrine in Samarra that was heavily damaged in a February bombing that unleashed the sectarian bloodletting.
In exchange for al-Dhari’s agreement, al-Sadr said, he’d condemn any aggression against the Sunni cleric, who leads the militant Association of Muslim Scholars. Al-Dhari has been out of the country for several weeks and didn’t respond immediately to al-Sadr’s challenge.
Once Sunni insurgents renew their attacks on Sadr-aligned Shi’ite strongholds, Sadr will undoubtedly withdraw his gesture of goodwill toward al-Dhari and the Sunni community. Sadr’s ensuing aggression will then be viewed as completely justified by his constituent Shi’a, a boon to his political chances in the event of a governmental collapse following the potential walkout of his loyalists from the cabinet.
The third facet of the Sadr plan: calling for Shi’ite consolidation. Around himself, that is:
Al-Sadr also beseeched rival Shiite parties to put aside their political differences and unite in a call for calm. Otherwise, he implied, the central Shiite religious authority, known as the hawza, could become irrelevant.
“Why has the devil made his way between us? This will serve only the colonizers and will harm the hawza,” al-Sadr said. “Here is my hand - I put it forward in reconciliation. Will there be a hand reaching out for mine?”
Sadr is positioning himself as a leader, no longer content to play the kingmaker to Maliki’s Da’wa party. When Maliki meets with Bush (he really has little choice, for his own sake), al-Sadr’s allies will quit the government and create a constitutional crisis. Sadr, appearing committed to creating an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem, will emerge as the biggest winner in comparison to a weak prime minister that has been effectively painted as an ineffectual pawn of an outside power. Then, rising to power, Sadr will continue the process of Shi’ite consolidation and attempt to set the vilayat-al-fiqh system in place, similar to the Iranian model.
Or so goes the Sadr plan. He’ll run into several obstacles, of course, including the United States, the rival SCIRI and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the quietist Shi’ite clergy loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and a Sunni insurgency that is unlikely to buy into a Sadrist version of Islamic populism (forget that Sadr is a Shi’ite, he’s merely a mid-level cleric.) Regardless, the pawns are in place and chaos is sure to ensue, as always.
Update: The NY Times reports that Shi’ite militia have attacked Sunni neighborhoods in Baquba and Baghdad. Sadr’s Mahdi Army is being blamed, which is certain to make his attempt to appear as the peacemaker fall flat. The attacks are rather telling, since they suggest that Sadr doesn’t have complete control over the situation and would be unable to instill any sort of peace if allotted a greater position of power. Also, it’s possible that some of these attacks are being made by the SCIRI’s Badr Brigades, since they effectively discredit Sadr in the eyes of the Sunni despite his populist rhetoric. None of this is surprising — no one truly holds the reins of chaos in Iraq, least of all the United States.
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