Migration has increasingly become a hot button issue in the era of globalization. As economics forces countries to become more open, the barriers separating states and their people have lessened, and in some as cases been completely lifted. The European Union pursues a policy of open borders between its member states, while the countries of the NAFTA region restrict border access with varying degrees of success. For free trade to be effective, access to countries has to be fairly easy to gain, although this has raised a number of security concerns in a world threatened by terrorism. Also, migrant workers tend to fill large gaps within their new countries’ workforce populations, making them invaluable. However, the massive influx of migrant workers into Europe have highlighted cultural assimilation problems that open borders are incapable of repairing. The United States with its continuing Mexican immigration issues may see similar issues as low wage immigrant laborers create tension with domestic Americans who view their presence as detrimental to the economic wellbeing of the American-born worker.

The European Union and NAFTA are not exactly similar at their core, but their experience with migrant labor can be compared to a point. The EU, unlike NAFTA, is a confederation of states more similar to a United States of Europe than a a trade bloc. The EU member states are politically and economically cohesive units despite sharing different cultural backgrounds. NAFTA, on the other hand, is a trade zone minus political cohesiveness – the three countries have only agreed to free trade with one another, which has not resulted in completely open borders for the free movement of labor. Completely open borders in the NAFTA region would lead to a massive influx of Mexican workers into the United States since the economic situation and standard of living pales in comparison to the US and Mexico. Despite some border restrictions, Mexican laborers still make their way into the US illegally, and more than doubled in number from 1990 to 2000. The EU also feared similar problems when it admitted the poorer states of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004. A number of Europeans were concerned that the poor from these new member states would immediately flood into their countries to achieve a better standard of living, or worse – siphon money from their welfare state systems (the Roma, or Gypsies, mainly from Poland and Slovakia were a major concern). Obviously, an open border system in the EU invites such situations, but it exists for a reason – the Europeans have held a historic propensity to welcome migrant labor. Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa were invited into Europe following the second World War to aid in reconstruction, and continued migration is required to fill labor gaps in European states where the retired population has begun to vastly outgrow the labor force. Legalized migration is required so workers can be taxed to pay for continuously growing welfare state policies. The US also sees a need for migrant workers, mainly for construction and manufacturing work that many Americans do not wish to accept themselves. Also, American businesses benefit since they are capable of paying illegal immigrants less money than they otherwise would be required to pay by law. Unlike the EU, these migrant workers do not directly benefit the US welfare state outside of paying sales tax on items consumed. Under the Bush administration’s guest worker program, it seems that taxes will not be taken out of temporary workers’ pay since they are, theoretically, temporary US residents who will never benefit from welfare services after retirement.

Security is a major concern when it comes to migration across borders. While there has yet to be a clear-cut case of cross-border terrorism (there was debate that the 9/11 hijackers entered the US via Canada, but that was proven false) , Canada’s lax standards on amnesty and refugees has created concern in the US. Also, Mexico’s desire to bring in foreign capital via tourism has led it to not pursue a visa policy for a number of countries, including those in the EU. It would be fairly simple for a terrorist to move through Europe and enter Mexico with no more than a passport, and then enter into the US. Such potential problems are inescapable in today’s age of increased global trade and mobility, and it is doubtful that anything short of complete border clampdown can keep the countries of the world completely safe. But what is safety without the ability to grow and experience all the world has to offer, anyway?

There are a couple major things happening this week on the Syrian front in the Long War. First, Damascus has officially normalized diplomatic relations with Iraq. It might seem like a surprising turn of events, but it really shouldn’t be. The secular Syrian and religious Iraqi governments both are interested in repressing Islamist (read: Sunni) extremism, and both hold positive, albeit complicated relations with Iran. Syria has been routinely accused of allowing Sunni extremists to utilize Syria as a base of operations, but any government complicity in such operations is most likely rooted within the regime’s Old Guard, aka the Ba’athist hardliners that are still completely loyal to the late Hafez al-Assad. The Old Guard wants a resurgence of pan-Arab Ba’athism, specifically the Syrian kind, and would be overjoyed to see Iraqi Ba’athists come to power and owe Syria for their successes. So, the current policy course correction can mean one of two things: 1.) The Old Guard Ba’athists are seeing reality, finally, and know that the religious Shi’a are in Baghdad to stay, or 2.) Hafez’s son, Bashar, is finally reining in his father’s old friends and adopting pragmatism as an operational imperative. Or maybe it’s a combination of the two. Regardless, the geopolitics of the Middle East continue to shift.

In Lebanon, pro-Syrian/Iranian forces are causing massive headaches. Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon’s Minister of Industry and a leading anti-Syrian Christian, was assassinated on Tuesday. Gemayel’s death is an ominous omen suggesting that a time of increased hostility between the historically combative Lebanese factions is at hand. With the recent resignations of Hizbollah and Hizbollah-allied Shi’ite cabinet ministers and Gemayel’s death, a governmental crisis is almost guaranteed. Hizbollah will soon call for free elections and will see significant gains, and if it does not, Fuad Saniora’s government will continue to be held hostage.

I hate to admit it, but this is just the beginning.

Ezra Klein on the Bush administration’s reluctance to withdraw from Iraq:

The question, of course, is why we don’t [withdraw from Iraq]. What’s the compelling national interest in occupying a country that deplores our presence? That murders our soldiers? That depletes our treasury? That shows no sign, hint, or hope of molding itself to our desires?

There is none. Instead, we remain in Iraq because the current Administration is afraid to put a loss on the board. We remain in Iraq to avoid a blow to our national self-esteem. So long as we’ve boots, guns, and grunts in their country, there’s always the chance that a stretch of good weather and the tranquil vibes unleashed by the global orgasm for peace will calm the region down, and we’ll be able to dart out in a moment of relative optimism and goodwill, reputation intact. To leave now, conversely, would be to admit defeat. And no one making the decisions — not the elected officials protecting their legacy nor the colonels seeking promotion — will be the one to codify our humiliation. That’s understandable on an individual level, but in the aggregate, it means we’re not merely asking men to die for a mistake, we’re asking them to perish to protect our ego.

Ezra sees the current dilemma in Iraq as one of American egotism, rooted deeply within a jingoistic administration that refuses to admit mistakes and withdraw when no other options appear available. In the abstract, I find myself agreeing with Ezra’s broad view, but there’s so much more to all of this than simple ego, which is important to consider if terrible mistakes are to be avoided.

Ego is a big facet of the Iraqi debacle, but it is not the only one that makes leaving the Iraqis to their own devices a difficult decision to make. Long-term strategy must be taken into account at this point, otherwise any move will make the already disastrous completely irreparable. Some argue that the situation is irreparable anyhow, but the fact remains that the US presence in Iraq is a stabilizing force considering the alternative.

I can actually hear the eyes rolling. I’m not claiming that the American military occupation has made the country a stable entity overall, positively affecting all aspects of Iraqi society. No, I am simply stating that the US military allows the current government to function — to a certain, small degree. Minus the American presence, the Shi’ite factions would easily shatter and make a governing coalition nearly impossible to cobble together. Iraq would break into its component parts, with the Sunni insurgency growing into a viable force in the civil war. The rivalry between Muqtada al-Sadr and the SCIRI’s Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, steeped in generations of family feuding, will boil over completely and render the moderate, quietist clerical elements such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani completely ineffectual on the political stage. Iran would be forced to step in and pick a side — the traditionally loyal SCIRI, or the Iraqi nationalist Sadr who relishes the opportunity to publicly denounce the SCIRI’s Iranian connections while receiving advice and support from certain circles within Iran itself. Under the current arrangement the Da’wa party, the party of current Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, holds together a fractious governmental coalition through sheer willpower and, most importantly, American support. While Maliki views Sadr as a needed ally, it is a marriage of convenience since both Maliki and Sadr oppose full SCIRI control over Iraq. The presence of American forces keeps Sadr in line and allows Maliki to function without being held hostage to Sadr and his Mahdi Army’s every whim, while Sadr and the Mahdi Army allow Maliki to retain power in the face of overwhelming SCIRI popularity.

This is a obviously a ridiculously complicated situation; not at all unlike a nightmarish game of jenga. While the American occupation undoubtedly creates many problems — empowering the anti-American insurgency and riling up Sadr’s messianic Mahdi cult, for instance — to simply pull the United States out on a whim could create a chain reaction with numerous unintended consequences. A wider war in the Middle East including crippling refugee crises would be one of those potential outcomes. In other words, ego is not the only issue holding policymakers back on bringing US troops home, as Ezra suggests. It definitely calculates in, but the situation is much too complex to cover in broad gestures.

I am not naive, as I do realize Iraq is the biggest of all political footballs, and the conversation will proceed with numerous generalizations. I do offer this, though: It was a lack of planning and quick action that led the US to this current situation. It’d be nice if the same mistake could be avoided on the exit.

Ted Koppel has apparently joined up with the Discovery Channel and produced a documentary that tries to explain the decades of antecedents behind the latest US/Iran impasse by uncovering the average Iranian’s view of the United States. It is an attempt at mutual understanding, an intriguing and needed project, to be certain. Unfortunately, it suffers from an expected pro-American, anti-Iranian bias at times, propagated by Koppel himself even if he doesn’t realize it. The documentary’s absolutist title, Iran: The Most Dangerous Country, should be hint enough that the content will be a bit skewed. While I applaud Koppel and the producers of the Discovery Channel for bringing attention to the historical basis of Iranian/American animosity, it should be obvious that one should not consistently interrupt an Iranian woman while she publicly speaks of reform. To be more clear, the woman is Dr. Massoumeh Ebtekar — former Vice President under moderate president Mohammad Khatami, and English translator for the US diplomats during the 1979 Hostage Crisis. Here’s a portion of the transcript, beginning with Ebtekar broaching the topic of moderate reform following Khatami’s election and her appointment as VP (thanks to the magical rewind capability of DVR):

Ebtekar: There was an opportunity to see things in a different light. But unfortunately, it was not taken properly — but on the contrary, we can say the climax of the reform process [was when] Iran was termed a member of the Axis of Evil by the Bush Administration, which was a severe blow to the –

Koppel: That’s a, that’s a nasty phrase. Do you think it sort of matches “The Great Satan”?

Ebtekar: This is the way it goes…

Koppel: Exactly, words.

Ebtekar: The reality is that this blow came at a time when we were pushing for a geniuine democratic movement in Iran –

Koppel: But this is coming at a time where the United States is still being denounced as the “Great Satan” in Iran. I made the mistake back in 1979 when I first heard that phrase “The Great Satan”, what a silly phrase. They don’t really mean it. But you did mean it, you meant exactly that. You meant that the United States was, in a sense, the embodiment of evil.

Ebtekar: I think the Iman made that reference based on that understanding that the Americans have no recognition for human rights when it comes to their interests. The only thing they see is to protect those interests by any means.

Koppel’s insistence on “The Great Satan” squelched a chance for a real conversation centered on the reform movement. Instead, his antagonism spurred Ebtekar to throw back her own incendiary remarks, feeding into the cycle of damaging words Koppel himself acknowledged as counterproductive. I don’t necessarily blame Koppel for falling into such a rhetorical trap — if anything, it’s emblematic of the aggregate American view of Iran. The 1979 Hostage Crisis remains heavy on the public’s collective conscious, and it, along with Iran-Contra, are deeply ingrained within the foreign policy establishment’s institutional memory, as well. The fear and animosity are almost genetic at this point, but it can be reversed. While Koppel tends to slip up here and at other times, at least his goal seems pure by pursuing this direly needed Dialogue of Civilizations.