Military power plays a vital role in Iraq – in actuality, it plays a number of roles currently, which is at the root of the problem. Military force should only be used in order to attain military goals, generally being either the attainment or defense of territory, and/or the destruction of enemy forces. In Iraq, however, the administration is utilizing force to destroy Iraqi insurgents, defend the Green Zone, and affect political outcomes within the Iraqi system by acting as a counterbalance for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki against rival Shi’a parties and their militias, as well as Sunni insurgents. The presence of American forces in Baghdad is actually inhibiting the Iraqi political process instead of re-enforcing it by propping up an ineffectual prime minister due to the administration’s aversion to deal directly with the more popular (and more conservative) Shi’a parties. For the Iraqi political process to unfold naturally, a pre-requisite is the full withdrawal of American forces from the country. In no other way will an Iraqi government be considered fully legitimate, something required before any sort of reconciliation between the country’s disparate communities can begin.
Also, the belief that the American armed forces alone can somehow avert random attacks on Iraqi civilians is erroneous. While martial law conditions have affected the amount of attacks in the past during high security time periods, specifically federal election days, martial law itself is not something that can be maintained indefinitely. Even if it could be, it would strike at the heart of the democratic project that is currently being undertaken within the country. The unpredictability of suicide bombings in particular make securing the civilian population an almost impossible task, since it is political considerations and societal cleavages that create the impetus for suicide attacks and other bombings.
There will always be opportunities for sectarian conflict to be ratcheted to higher levels, as well, and that is true whether or not American forces occupy bases throughout Iraq. The targeting of religious holy sites has been a favorite of Sunni insurgents, as in the Karbala shrine earlier this year. Minus a much larger American troop presence, not every religious site, let alone every religious leader, can be adequately shielded from the wrath of civil war. The assassination of a religious leader, such as the Shi’a Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in August of 2003, can cause immediate backlash and an escalation in violence. If someone as influential as the SCIRI’s leader and Baqir al-Hakim’s son, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, were to be successfully killed by Sunni insurgents (an attempt was made on his life in the run-up to the January 2005 elections), the Iraqi civil war would immediately explode into something far more disastrous than its current incarnation and the US military would be powerless to stop it. Only through a change in Iraq’s overall political culture can sectarian attacks cease to be a means of discourse, and only Iraqis can bring about such change.
American military force is not completely without merit, however. When combined with the local expertise of Iraqi forces the American military proves the most effective, as in the recent thwarting of an attempt on Grand Ayatollah al-Siatani’s life by a Shi’a cult. The US military does not need to be within Iraq to be called upon, however. A withdrawal to the regional allies of Kuwait and Qatar would allow the US to retain relative quick strike ability through the air and remain supportive of the developing Iraqi ground forces. Also, by not being tied down within the Iraqi theater, the American military will be free to place pressure on rivals, particularly Iran, in hopes of increasing American power at the negotiation table. The administration would also be free to strike anywhere within Iraq it deemed necessary in order to retard the development of al-Qaeda-aligned cells and Sunni insurgent strongholds. Withdrawal does not necessarily mean a decline in the United States’ military power or options in the Middle East.
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