With the United States mired in Iraq, Iran finds itself in an extremely powerful position. Its influence over the Shi’a parties in Iraq allots it the ability to directly affect the outcomes of the American mission in the country. The SCIRI is particularly close to Iran, as it took refuge under the Islamic Republic during Saddam Hussein’s reign and its Badr Organization militia was trained by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The al-Da’wa party was also housed in Iran for a number of years during its struggle against Hussein’s Ba’athist regime.
But these facts do not mean that Iran currently has ill intentions in Iraq, or that it hopes to stoke the flames of war to create a puppet state beholden to Iranian interests. For that to occur, the Shi’a themselves would have to desire that outcome, which is not the case. Muqtada al-Sadr, who is a strong believer in the Islamic Republic’s vilayat-al-fiqh governmental system (rule by clerics), is extremely nationalistic and often uses his SCIRI rivals’ ties to Iran as a bludgeon with which to beat them on issues of importance to Iraqis. Certainly there is a political motivation behind al-Sadr’s anti-Iranian pronouncements since his own spiritual advisor, Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Hosseini al-Haeri, is based in Iran, but the fact that he must make such thinly veiled attacks is a sign of the limits of Iranian power. Also, the inclusion of Sunni and Kurdish leaders weary of Iranian influence within the cabinet makes any extensive Iranian meddling difficult to disguise.
While there is little doubt that Iraq will remain an individual state separate from Iran, relations between the two are undoubtedly close. In 2004 then Prime Minister Jaafari signed two memoranda of understanding with Iranian leaders on economic and transportation cooperation. Due to the two countries’ similar religious and cultural backgrounds, it is understandable that such cooperation exists and will undoubtedly expand further for as long as the Shi’a rule in Baghdad. Regardless, the administration and Sunni regimes in the region – specifically Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt – are concerned that such cooperation, including the military aid Iran has directed toward Shi’a factions within Iraq’s government, and the growing influence of Iran-aligned Hizbollah in Lebanon, has offered Iran too much power and influence in the Middle East. While the situation is not as dire as most assume, there is some validity in the argument – but there is a potential solution that could contain Iran and also calm Iraq’s continuing civil war.
With the United States withdrawing its military forces from Iraq to Kuwait and Qatar, Iran would be forced to take ownership of the situation within the borders of its new ally to the west. If Iran is so inclined to become a regional power, it must be prepared to act as one. The potential for Iran to act as a force of moderation by way of its influence on Shi’a leaders exists since Iran would only be harmed by intensified conflict in the region. Any Iranian play for increased power in Baghdad, or any attempt to utilize Shi’a-controlled Basra as a mini-puppet state within Iraq, could possibly lead to the direct intervention of Iraq’s Sunni rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia. Relations between the countries have been tense due to the situations in Iraq and Lebanon, with Saudi Arabia active in diplomatic efforts to return stability to the region. However, a recent meeting between Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Saudi royalty apparently ended on unpleasant terms since Ahmadinejad left Riyadh a full day earlier than originally scheduled.
The United States must be diplomatically proactive alongside Saudi Arabia, as well, in order to force Iran into coercing its Shi’a friends in Baghdad to make the tough decisions aimed at bringing about a true consensus government. How can the United States force Iran into lobbying for partial re-Ba’athification in Iraq, for instance, despite that country’s bloody history with the Ba’ath party? It starts with Syria.
Breaking Syria away from Iran’s influence is a vital first step in the diplomatic offensive. Iran’s status among Islamic extremists - -Shi’a and Sunni alike — is revered, especially after the summer war between Iran and Syria-backed Hizbollah and Israel. Unless Iran’s status among the Islamic populace is somehow lowered, there is little hope of getting the Sunni Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to place open pressure on Tehran since it would lead to domestic backlash. To accomplish this goal, the United States will have to make a concerted diplomatic effort toward Syria in relation to the status of the Golan Heights.
Syria’s support for Hizbollah stems from its desire to regain the territory it lost to Israel, the Golan Heights, in the Six Day War of 1967. Syria showed interest in a peace agreement with Israel separate from the Palestinian issue recently, but the administration nixed higher-level negotiations. So, the desire on both the Israeli and Syrian sides is present, but the administration must be willing to push the process forward for anything of substance to actually occur.
The administration has been resistant to opening any sort of dialogue with Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime since its opposition to the Iraq war and supposed hand in perpetrating violence in Iraq. Also, relations worsened following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, in which Assad’s brother-in-law and military intelligence chief, Assef Shawkat, was implicated for in a UN investigation. Despite these issues al-Assad has actually aided the United States in the past, sharing intelligence on al-Qaeda cells following the 9/11 attacks. Syria and the United States do share many of the same goals in Iraq, which includes stabilization and reduction of Sunni extremist elements within that country. Al-Assad himself is an Alawite, an offshoot of Twelver Shi’ism that is considered heretical even by the region’s Shi’a community, and views Islamic extremism as a threat to his authority and personal safety – the Muslim Brotherhood retains a strong following in Syria, which often caused trouble for Al-Assad’s father Hafez up until his razing of the Brotherhood’s safe haven, Hama, in 1982. Also, the refugee crisis created by the Iraqi war is causing economic trouble for Syria and could lead to increased Islamic extremism that may one day directly threaten al-Assad’s rule.
There are members of al-Assad’s regime, specifically the Ba’athist idealists of his father Old Guard, as Levant expert Flyntt Leverett calls them, which would be interested in seeing Syrian-style Ba’athism develop in Baghdad. However, al-Assad is disinterested in such a scenario and, being more moderate than his father, may be interested in normalizing relations with the United States and breaking away from Iran if the issue of the Golan Heights was resolved. Being the first Arab leader since Anwar al-Sadat to actually receive previously held territory from Israel, al-Assad would be allotted the political cover required to break direct ties with Iran and normalize relations with the United States and Israel. With the Golan safely back in Syrian hands, al-Assad’s support for an armed Hizbollah would no longer be viewed as a requirement in Damascus, leading to decreased Iranian influence in the Levant.
With Iran reeling from losing an ally in Syria and losing easy access to the Hizbollah militants in Lebanon, Tehran would be disinclined to provoke an anti-Iranian alliance of Egyptians, Jordanians, Saudis, and Americans. An opening for negotiations on Iraq would then come into being, with the Americans operating from a much stronger position than they could currently inhabit in today’s regional environment. Iran may feel it necessary to lobby the Iraqi Shi’a parties to keep the oil wealth-sharing deal fair, clamp down on militia activity, and allow partial, low-level re-Ba’athification – all outcomes the United States has been arguing for, but has been unsuccessful in attaining due to its status as the foreign occupier. Concessions on the nuclear issue may also be a possibility.
Hard choices must be made in Iraq, and only from a position of understanding the key issues and factions can sound policies be crafted and implemented. A broad diplomatic imitative is required to solve the problem of Iraq. An American military withdrawal and re-grouping in Kuwait and Qatar combined with a more cooperative Syrian regime will force Iran to act as a positive influence in Iraq in order to retain its own stability in the face of an overwhelming regional anti-Iranian alliance. These policy prescriptions may sound drastic and, perhaps, improbable – but drastic maneuvers are required in order to repair a regional disaster that is quickly nearing the point of no return.
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