The Digital Diplomat

The Unbearable Lightness of Being Nouri al-Maliki

by Justin Delabar on 28/11/08 at 11:38 am

Nouri al-Maliki has achieved what once would have seemed impossible for him: a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States that meets the vast majority of his demands. Just two years ago, Maliki was chosen as a weak consensus Prime Minister meant to satiate the demands of Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers while disallowing the overly powerful Suprme Islamic Iraqi Council even greater power. Today, al-Maliki is easily the most powerful politician in Iraq, with some suggesting his strength could reach almost dictatorial levels.

Maliki has accomplished this feat by taking on an issue that was an obvious win with far-reaching support: the scheduled removal of American forces in Iraq. The political and security situation did not always favor this outcome for Maliki, however. After his ascension to the premiership he was greatly beholden to Muqtada al-Sadr, as it was the Sadr bloc’s support that assured Maliki’s victory over the SIIC’s nominee. Maliki’s Da’wa party, lacking any sort of powerful paramilitary wing unlike  the SIIC and the Sadrists, found itself caught in the middle of an intense intra-Shi’a rivalry. Muqtada al-Sadr believed himself to be the kingmaker in this scenario, and pushed his hand forcefully whenever he could to influence policy with an anti-American bent. Near the end of 2006, Sadr threatened to boycott Maliki’s government if he were to meet with President Bush in Jordan. Maliki found himself at a crossroads with a need to choose between the United States and Sadr. He met with Bush. Maliki’s situation had required him to keep nearly all parties happy and pliable in order for him to not only govern, but survive in a position of influence, so the choice to rebuff Sadr was not one he could have easily made. When pressed, though, Maliki knew that his fate was directly connected to how he handled the American issue due to the security and political realities on the ground in Baghdad. Sadr’s support would have meant little had it led to the alienation of the United States, Maliki’s biggest cheerleader and security guarantor at the time.

Maliki survived the political showdown with Sadr, albeit weakened and appearing  beholden to a foreign occupier.  The political situation had changed, and Maliki shrewdly altered his tactics in order to adapt. Over the last year, Maliki has aligned himself openly against the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army while successfully using a tough stance on the US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to frame himself as a champion of Iraqi independence. Without the SOFA negotiations, Maliki would have been unable to take on al-Sadr without being considered an American puppet.

With the SOFA passed by parliament and now up for national referendum, Maliki basks in the glow of a victory that publicly eviscerated Muqtada al-Sadr’s political power and  won broad-based support across Iraq’s sectarian divide.  Now Nouri al-Maliki looks to the future as a politician to be feared, not simply handled by what were once considered more powerful interests. But, was this outcome directly related to Maliki’s skill at conducting political ninjitsu in the most dangerous of arenas, or did circumstances deftly guide Maliki’s hand?

According to this McClatchy piece (via Juan Cole), it seems Maliki may be more versatile and cunning than what was originally believed:

The political fault line centers on Maliki’s effort to reach out to Iraqi tribes through organizations called support councils. He views them as an extension of the Sunni Awakening, an American-supported effort in 2006 and 2007 to fight al Qaida in Iraq by working closely with Sunni tribes.

But on these councils the tribes are paid for from Maliki’s office and loyal to the central government.

Opponents fear they’ll be used to boost Maliki’s party in next year’s elections at their expense and with the sway of cash steal support from politically powerful parties such as the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the north and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq that dominates in the Shiite south.

The councils also trigger concerns that Maliki will use their political power to diminish Kurdish power in the disputed areas such as oil rich Kirkuk and northern Nineveh province in Iraq’s north, and in the south kill a dream of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq for a federal Shiite region in the south.

By that reasoning, the support councils keep the tribes appeased and working on behalf of the Iraqi government.

These “support councils” seem to consist of tribes that were never fully behind the Ba’athist worldview, but enjoyed the money provided by Saddam Hussein’s government in exchange for allegience. The US under General Petraeus understood and acted with knowledge of that fact, and Maliki appears to be using his influence and control over government coffers to create similar patronage networks. It is a strategy that has a chance of creating a wider base of support for Da’wa at the expense of the maturation of a healthy democracy. A similar model can be seen in Syria, where uberminority Alawite dictators — the Assads — have been able to cling to power for nearly 40 years. It is not easy to envision where Iraq goes from here due to  innumerable variables, but it is certain that Nouri al-Maliki will now have a strong hand in shaping whatever the outcome may be.