Syria is feeling the great strain of absorbing tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees:

Syria, the last Arab country welcoming large numbers of Iraqi refugees, is now all but closing the gates and leaving 40,000 Iraqis who flee their country each month with almost no place to go.

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Syria kept its doors open even after others, including Jordan and Egypt with 700,000 and 130,000 Iraqi refugees respectively, said they could take no more. But the strain on its small, state-controlled economy apparently has become too great.

Despite the administration’s line to the contrary, Syria truly does not gain anything by stoking the flames of war in its neighbor to the east. Certainly, lax border patrol most likely exists — the Syria-Iraq border is expansive. Syria also undoubtedly views its position on Iraq vis-a-vis the border issue as a sort of bargaining tactic, a way to force the United States into negotiations over other outstanding issues such as the status of the Golan Heights. However, even in the case of a concentrated effort to stop cross-border raids, Syria has little control over the chaos in Iraq. In fact, as this refugee crisis suggests, it is being harmed in numerous ways by the Iraqi civil war. Not only can the Syrian economy not support the massive influx of Iraqi refugees, the country is being filled with Iraqis that have a very good chance of becoming radicalized. It is the slow al-Qaedaification of Syria, the strengthening of radicalized Islamic ideology. To the ignorant it all seems as if this is a boon for Syria, a part of the overall plan. It most certainly is not.

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There are a couple major things happening this week on the Syrian front in the Long War. First, Damascus has officially normalized diplomatic relations with Iraq. It might seem like a surprising turn of events, but it really shouldn’t be. The secular Syrian and religious Iraqi governments both are interested in repressing Islamist (read: Sunni) extremism, and both hold positive, albeit complicated relations with Iran. Syria has been routinely accused of allowing Sunni extremists to utilize Syria as a base of operations, but any government complicity in such operations is most likely rooted within the regime’s Old Guard, aka the Ba’athist hardliners that are still completely loyal to the late Hafez al-Assad. The Old Guard wants a resurgence of pan-Arab Ba’athism, specifically the Syrian kind, and would be overjoyed to see Iraqi Ba’athists come to power and owe Syria for their successes. So, the current policy course correction can mean one of two things: 1.) The Old Guard Ba’athists are seeing reality, finally, and know that the religious Shi’a are in Baghdad to stay, or 2.) Hafez’s son, Bashar, is finally reining in his father’s old friends and adopting pragmatism as an operational imperative. Or maybe it’s a combination of the two. Regardless, the geopolitics of the Middle East continue to shift.

In Lebanon, pro-Syrian/Iranian forces are causing massive headaches. Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon’s Minister of Industry and a leading anti-Syrian Christian, was assassinated on Tuesday. Gemayel’s death is an ominous omen suggesting that a time of increased hostility between the historically combative Lebanese factions is at hand. With the recent resignations of Hizbollah and Hizbollah-allied Shi’ite cabinet ministers and Gemayel’s death, a governmental crisis is almost guaranteed. Hizbollah will soon call for free elections and will see significant gains, and if it does not, Fuad Saniora’s government will continue to be held hostage.

I hate to admit it, but this is just the beginning.

The latest Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, which focusses on the relationship between Iran and Syria, sugests that the current situation in Lebanon makes Bashar al-Assad’s position vis-a-vis a regional Sh’ite/Sunni split more difficult:

Experts say the leaders of several Sunni countries in the region are worried about the rising influence of Shiite Iran. “A regional war is a losing proposition for them,” Hokayem says. “Who’s going to be the anti-Israel, anti-United States champion? It’s going to be Iran, not them.” Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—all Sunni nations—took the unusual step of criticizing Hezbollah at a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers July 15.

However, cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi Shiite leader, has spoken out in support of Hezbollah. Many regional leaders fear a full-fledged sectarian war in Iraq could spark
a similar conflict across the region, which could pose a quandary for Assad’s secular regime. “If there was a regional military war between Sunnis and Shias, the Syrians will be hard-pressed” to choose sides, Hokayem says.

If anything, the continuing conflict has strengthened Assad’s position both domestically and among the more radical Arab public due to his past and continuing support of Hizbollah. The current strain of thought that is emerging is that Syria may move closer to the West if the right signals are sent, both by the US and its Arab allies in the current conflict, but that’s doubtful considering the current upswing Assad is riding. As long as Hizbollah remains popular and embroiled in conflict, Assad will remain popular. While his relationship to Tehran has dragged him unwittingly into the current situation, he is reaping dividends by appearing tougher on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict than the regional Sunni powers. Syria may be a lackey of Iran, but that relationship is currently opening up tremendous regional opportunities for Assad’s regime and proving a massive public relations win.

Via the Wall Street Journal Online:

Lebanon’s army, which so far has sat on the sidelines of the violence raging in the country, will join the fight against Israel if Israeli forces invade the country, Defense Minister Elias Murr said on Al-Jazeera television. “The Lebanese army — and I stress — the Lebanese army will resist and defend and will prove that it is an army that deserves respect,” he said. In most of the previous Israeli attacks, including in 1978 and the 1982 invasion in which Beirut was occupied, the Lebanese army largely stayed out of the fighting. Twenty Lebanese soldiers have been killed in strikes on their bases during the nine-day-old Israeli bombardment of Lebanon.

It’s probably somewhat important to note that Elias Murr is the son-in-law of Lebanese president, and Syrian lackey, Emile Lahoud. With Hizbollah holding nearly a fourth of the Lebanese parliament and two seats in the cabinet (energy and foreign ministires), and with Damascus-leaning Murr at defense, the Lebanese army entering on behalf of Hizbollah does not look like an impossible scenario. The possibility is only multiplied when the continued destruction of the Lebanese infastructure is taken into account. Israeli targeting of civilain-heavy areas is meant to disable the transportation networks Hizbollah could utilize to either move the two Israeli soldiers out of the country, or receive logistical support from Iran via Syria. While that goal is most likely attained, the unforuntate side effect is massive popular unrest among Lebanese citizens aimed at Israel, not Hizbollah. All the factors are adding up to a possible escalation with the unexpected entry of the Lebanese army on behalf of Hizbollah, and with popular Lebanese support.

Brookings’ Flynt Leverett, in an article that opens by comparing the Syrian regime to the Godfather, takes a similar line as myself on Bashar al-Assad’s most attractive option in the wake of the UN demand for full investigative cooperation:

But [Asef] Shawkat and Maher [al-Assad] may have ambitions of their own. Shawkat’s wife, Bashar’s older sister Bushra, is by all accounts the most politically astute and ambitious of the Assad children, but because of her sex, she must pursue politics through her husband. Shawkat himself is no shrinking violet; he eloped with Bushra over her family’s objections when Hafez Assad was at the height of his powers. Bashar’s younger brother Maher has been described by an astute Western diplomat who knows him as a brutal and primitive man, possessing “all of Basil’s appetites but none of his qualities.” Maybe, just maybe, Bashar will treat the U.N. investigation as a chance to get rid of one or both of his most potent long-term rivals, and be the only man left standing at the end of the day.

Leverett suggests that Assad may not have directly ordered the assassination, which is not exactly outlandish. His disdain for Hariri was not exactly secret, and it’s highly doubtful he shed crocodile tears at the news of the assassination. However, there is simply too little information available — at least in the public sphere — to adequately put events together and ascertain where, exactly, the idea came from. Assad could have ordered the assassination or Maher, or Shawkat, could have taken the initiative for a despotic dictator that has traditionally been viewed as too weak among Damascus-based hardliners. Now dead (by suicide, supposedly) interior minister Ghzai Kana’an also plays into the story. If anything, the Mehlis report has cemented the fact that Syria is run by a regime of hotheads and countervailining personal and professional interests, led by someone comparable to the absent-minded professor with a lisp. Not exactly a non-toxic combination, but, sadly, it may be the least dangerous of all Syrian configurations currently available.

More tonight, hopefully, after the day job and class.