James Lewis suggests that China may well turn against a nuclear Iran, but a couple paragraphs are wildly inaccurate and make the rest of his rather weak argument suspect. First off:

China has its own radical Islamists, the restless Ughuirs. Beijing doesn’t want a bloody Chechnyan rebellion, or its own intifada, like the one foolish France is now experiencing. It especially doesn’t want an Islamofascist Pakistan on its borders, armed with nukes and ICBMs and run by expansionist martyrs.

First, the Uighurs. Sure, they’re Muslims, but their desire to be an independent state is based on a nationalistic sense of belonging to the community of central Asian nations, not radical Islamist ideology. While Wahhabism (or Salafism, depending on who you ask) is evident among the Uighurs, it is Sufism, a spiritual, moderate form of Islamic worship, that is the most widely practiced Islamic tradition in Uighuri communities. Also, “expansionist martyrs” is a decent example of an oxymoron. How can one be an expansionist if he is a martyr? I mean, he’d be pretty dead and not very expansive. Khomeini was an expansionist and loved 10-year-old martyrs, aka the Basijj militia, but he certainly wasn’t a martyr himself since that’d be quite a big impediment in overseeing the Islamic Revolution. A small quibble.

Second, Pakistan. While a Pakistan ruled openly by Wahhbist radicals would be disastrous for global security, China is supportive of a nuclear Pakistan as the situation in Islamabad currently stands. China and India aren’t exactly the best of friends, with disagreements over the border territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh remaining long after the 1963 Sino-Indian War. Unless a radical shift occurs in South Asia, it’s doubtful China will make a major course correction in its policies toward nuclear Pakistan.

Moving on, regarding Iran and Russia:

It’s not that Putin wants Islamist fanatics next door in Iran. He instinctively fears them, because the Russians have fought Islamic aggression for a thousand years. But Putin has his own jihadi rebellion to worry about in Chechnya. It seems likely that Ahmadinejad has promised to do his part to hold down the jihadis in Chechnya as long as the Russians support his nuclear program. Like the Chinese, Russia also has oil interests in Iran. So Russia has been pursuing a cynical French-style policy, playing both sides against each other and stealing as much oil and as many bribes as possible in the process.

Certainly Iran has kept it hands out of Chechnya and the former Soviet republics of central Asia, but Lewis is suggesting that Ahmadinejad is continuing such a policy in order to enforce an ultimatum on Russia. Iran would love to have such influence. If anything, Russia is utilizing Iranian intransigence on nuclear development as a “Persian curtain” to cut off Western influence from central Asia. Iran is set to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization alongside Russia, China, and a number of central Asian member states. A rising Iran will only strengthen the organization’s presence and ensure lessened Western — specifically American — influence in China and Russia’s geographic home turf. Plus, Iran is basically nothing without Russian support, something it’d obviously lose if it started trouble in Chechnya.

And Lewis’ oil argument? “Like the Chinese, Russia also has oil interests in Iran… stealing as much oil and as many bribes as possible in the process.” Sadly laughable. Russia produces more oil than Saudi Arabia, meaning there is no reason for oil to play a prominent role in Russia’s Iranian calculations. China is indeed a different story.

Lewis’ overall argument is that China may turn against Iran now that it sees what dealing with rogues, i.e. North Korea, could entail. I’d love to agree, but Beijing undoubtedly sees Tehran as a more rational actor than Pyongyang. And, amazingly, that is the correct view — at least Iran knows it needs to feign a civilian nuclear program to mask its true intentions.

That’s right. We’ve actually lived long enough to see a conservative Iranian establishment not be the most unpredictable regime on the planet. Hats off, North Korea. Hats off.

Mohamed ElBaradei , the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) chief, claimed today that up to 30 more states may go nuclear in the near future unless the non-proliferation regime is massively revamped:

Mr ElBaradei told a conference at the IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna that 20 to 30 countries “have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short timespan”. “We are dealing with almost, as I call them, virtual nuclear weapons states,” he said.

He said the lack of international security, and the failure of existing nuclear-armed states to dismantle their own arsenals, made it hard to persuade other countries not to work on nuclear programmes.

“Unfortunately, the political environment is not a very secure one… there are a lot of temptations (to develop nuclear weapons),” he said.

I hate to be the pessimist with the no-solution approach to this topic, but I can easily see where ElBaradei is coming from despite his aversion to name specifics. Iran’s nuclear advances are already sending tremors through the Middle East, something that the chaos in Iraq strongly reinforces. Saudi Arabia, which has had its own issues with Iran in the past (see the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing), will not be averse to going ahead with its own nuclear program if Iran’s influence continues to grow across the Fertile Crescent and bridges the Islamic Republic with the Shi’ite militant strongholds of the Levant.

Egypt is another concern despite being entirely committed to non-proliferation in the Middle East and Africa over the last decade or so. A resurgent Islamic Republic offers itself as a model for Islamic radicals the Middle East over, and nowhere is that more damaging than in a secular Egypt where the the wildly popular Muslim Brotherhood is barred from full electoral participation. Hizbollah’s skirmishes with Israel over the summer proved that anti-Zionist, anti-American sentiment is real in Egypt and is a powerful civil and political force, something a strengthened Iran reinforces through its own actions as well as through those of its proxy forces. Regardless, Egypt’s clout in the region remains strong and Iran, if it wishes to be the leading player in the Middle East, will eventually have to confront Egypitan power – and both Iranian and Egyptian officials are well aware of that fact. Perhaps recently announced Iran/Sudanese cooperation, including nuclear technology transfers, is a first step toward containing an Egyptian threat to the Islamic Republic’s new Middle Eastern order?

A nuclear Iran would force that country’s rivals in the region to re-consider their own nuclear status, in turn leading to a potential domino effect of disastrous proportions. The current situation in East Asia is similarly ponderous from a proliferation standpoint. While South Korea and Japan, especially, remain constrained by the American defense umbrella, there’s no guarantee that will always be the case if North Korea continues to act in wildly sporadic ways.